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


# **European Security: Towards 2000**

## **Conference Report**

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania  
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The Matthew B. Ridgway Center  
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# EUROPEAN SECURITY: TOWARDS 2000

## The Conference Report

September 25-26, 1991

### A Conference held at the University of Pittsburgh

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## **PART ONE**

### **SUMMARY OF MAJOR THEMES**

Changes in the security landscape in Europe since the summer of 1989 have been bewildering in their speed and intensity. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of a large proportion of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, the independence and democratization of the East European states, the reunification of Germany, the outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia, the progress of Western Europe towards the creation of a single market and political union, and the Paris Accords on arms control and conflict prevention and management measures, have contributed to a fundamental change in the landscape of European security. These changes have also created a great deal of conceptual confusion and uncertainty about the future direction of the European security system. This is hardly surprising. Coming as they did at the end of a period in which, as Raymond Aron once remarked, history appeared to have been frozen, developments in Europe moved with bewildering speed. As a result, European and American policy makers have been floundering about in an effort to find answers to some fundamental questions:

What are the implications of the changes for security and stability?

What role should existing institutions play in future European security arrangements?

How can strategy be designed when there is no obvious and salient threat to provide a yardstick for planning?

What is the balance of effort and responsibility between Western Europe and the United States in devising and maintaining a post Cold War security system in Europe?

What is the future role of the United States in European security matters?

Against this background, a conference on "European Security: Towards 2000" was held on September 25 and 26, 1991, at the University of Pittsburgh. Sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and the Ridgway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, the aim of the conference was to explore changing patterns of security in Europe in the aftermath of the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the changes in the Soviet Union following the failure of the coup in August 1991. The

participants were all specialists on European and Atlantic security, and papers were presented on the central issues relating to the future evolution of the European security system.

## **THE MAJOR THEMES**

To attempt to distill a rich conference agenda and a series of vigorous and wide-ranging discussions into a series of major themes inevitably does a disservice to the participants and to the discussions. Nevertheless, nine major themes were discernible. These included:

1. The nature of the changes that have taken place, and the extent to which the security environment in Europe will be more or less demanding than it was during the Cold War. One aspect of this is the extent to which the future will resemble Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. Some participants contended that Europe will be going forward to the past, and that post-Cold War Europe is likely to resemble Europe in the period when ethnic and nationalist tensions dominated the agenda. Others argued that the Europe of the 1990s is a Europe in which economic integration - at least in the Western part of the Continent - has superseded traditional national rivalries and made military force irrelevant to relations among the major powers. Few denied, though, that the end of the Cold War had brought with it a series of problems that had been contained, suppressed or ignored in the previous 40 years. If there was a general feeling that the euphoria of 1989 was somewhat premature, however, there were major differences about the seriousness of the new threats to security. According to some participants, the end of the Cold War meant an end to the danger of a large scale war in Europe - and the only real questions are now about the management of ethnic conflicts which, by their very nature, tend to be localized. Others thought that the security problems were much greater - shifting power relationships, greater fluidity, the re-emergence of ethnic and nationalist rivalries, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the reunification of Germany - and provide a mix that is potentially volatile and unstable.

2. The nature of German power in the new Europe and the role Germany is likely to play. On this issue there were sharp differences of perspective and approach among the participants. One view was that the only problems likely to arise would come from German insecurity - and the best way to offset this was to encourage Germany to become a nuclear power. Others, however, were more concerned about German power, arguing that this had to be contained. The debate was further complicated because some participants felt that Germany was unwilling to face its responsibilities and contribute more fully in the event of out-of-area contingencies such as the Gulf. Even among those who agreed that German power posed problems for Europe and that long run assertiveness would overcome short-term reticence, differences emerged over whether it was a problem of economic power or military equilibrium. Not surprisingly, there were also

differences about appropriate prescriptions, with some participants favoring the institutional constraints imposed by harnessing German power in the European Community and others continuing to regard NATO and the American military presence as the crucial constraints on German freedom of action and essential to continued peace and stability in Western Europe.

3. The future of what was the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in August 1991. One possibility that was mooted was the idea of a minimalist confederal structure, albeit one of uncertain membership and questionable sustainability. In essence, the idea was a structure which would allow the republics far greater autonomy, but would also act as a mechanism to coordinate and manage foreign and defense links and possibly, although not necessarily, economic ties. It was suggested that such an entity would continue to play an important part in international politics, not least because the dominant role would belong to Russia, which is a major player in its own right. At the same time, it was acknowledged that problems facing a confederation of this kind would be enormous. Not the least of these was the loss of highly trained manpower, especially intellectuals, which resulted from the declining economy, but exacerbated this decline and made it more difficult to reverse. Even though this prognosis was not a particularly optimistic one, it was challenged by other participants who saw no real alternative to continued disintegration and did not believe that a confederal structure was viable. In this view, centrifugal forces would continue unabated.

If there was no consensus on what would emerge from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there was broader agreement that, whatever the case, the West could not be indifferent to Russian power - although it was clear that this did not present the same kind of challenge as the old Soviet Union had posed to Western Europe. There was also agreement that future relationships among the constituent Soviet Republics carried with them the prospects for rivalry and overt conflict. The fact that the Ukraine was intent on having its own armed forces was seen as indicative of the problems that could arise as the constituent republics became engaged in a series of security dilemmas that could all too easily fuel conflict and instability.

4. The future stability of Eastern Europe. Several actual or potential sources of instability were identified. The first was nationalism, which, in turn, was seen as having two dimensions: intermingling nationalism, where multiple nationalities hold claims over statehood which are mutually exclusive (eg. Serbs and Croats, Armenians and Izaris); and attitudes of superiority which can easily result in aggressive forms of "hyper-nationalism." Other threats to stability in the states of Eastern Europe stem from their military forces. Although there is a movement toward civilian control of the military, areas of uncertainty remain: these concern national command authorities and their relationship to parliaments; civilian control of defense ministries; and subordination of military leaderships. Moreover, cuts in military budgets and reductions in forces are creating morale problems for the professional officer corps, and conscript disenchantment. Difficulties in the conversion of military industry to civilian industry as well as

more general problems relating to the economies and the environments of the East Europeans could develop in such a way as to encourage internal disorder and xenophobic nationalism. There was broad agreement that these internal problems are compounded by an external factor - the lack of a security framework for the states of Eastern Europe, and the uncertainty over whether the region is a bridge between East and West or a buffer. In these circumstances, insecurities among the states of Eastern Europe could prove both endemic and well-founded. There was a recognition among the participants that although Yugoslavia was not necessarily a model for the future of Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union, it was a salutary warning. Moreover, it highlighted the difficulties of finding an appropriate response to ethnic strife. Indeed, considerable discussion centered around the problems of peacekeeping in Yugoslavia. There were two broad dimensions to this: one concerned the kind of actions which could be taken in an effort to contain, limit or terminate the conflict; and the other concerned the issue of which institution is best equipped to deal with the situation. On the first, there was not a great deal of optimism while, on the second, there was broad agreement that this was a matter for the Europeans rather than for NATO as a whole.

5. The role of various institutions in the new European security environment. This element of the discussion had several dimensions. Some participants contended that the one tried and tested institution was NATO and that this remained the single most important bastion of security. Others argued that the Alliance had served its purpose, that it was an anachronism of the Cold War, and that it should either be significantly modified or disbanded. There was no consensus, however, on what should replace the Alliance. One claimant, as the institution of first resort, was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). But while CSCE had some support, there was also recognition of its shortcomings, of the fact that it was a large and unwieldy instrument for dealing with security challenges. The other claimant was the European Community. This had significant support from the European participants and from some Americans for several reasons. One was that the European Community is particularly well placed to assist Eastern Europe and the successor to the Soviet Union economically - thereby enhancing stability. The other was the feeling that Western Europe is, at last, emerging as a major actor in its own right, and, as part of this process, will naturally take over security roles which have hitherto been the prerogative of NATO. While the Western European Union (WEU) was seen as one device for achieving this, there was also a sense that the WEU could provide a European pillar in NATO. In the short-term, it would complement the Atlantic connection, while also providing an institutional framework for the transition from the Atlantic Europe of the Cold War to a European Europe.

6. The role of nuclear weapons in the new Europe. The broad consensus was that although nuclear weapons have a residual role in European security - and participants differed about its importance - they would certainly not be central. New deployments of nuclear weapons on German soil would be politically unacceptable, while further progress in arms control would

reduce nuclear forces already there. Although no one at the conference publicly predicted the Bush initiative of September 27, which declared that all American ground based nuclear weapons would be removed from Western Europe, this initiative was consistent with the expectations of the participants about the direction in which the United States and its European allies were likely to move. At the same time, the residual role of nuclear weapons was recognized by most participants. A sharp distinction was made between reduction in the level of nuclear forces and their elimination. In the short term, at least some kind of residue of "extended deterrence" was expected to remain in spite of NATO's modified doctrine and reduced numbers of weapons. Russia would also remain a significant nuclear power, while it was noted by some participants that the British and the French will expand their nuclear forces through the 1990s.

7. The recognition that out-of-area or, what one participant called, "out-of-function" crises would continue to be a problem for an Alliance formed to meet a single threat. Whether these threats arise in Eastern Europe or outside Europe, they are not part of NATO's traditional responsibility. Nevertheless, there was broad agreement that indifference to such challenges or crises was not a serious option. There were differences, however, about the nature of the actions that have to be taken, about the institutional framework for taking them, and about the extent to which the United States or the European allies should take the lead in responding to new problems.

8. The importance of domestic politics in Europe in determining the future. This was particularly true in Germany, France, and Britain, as well as in the states of Eastern Europe. While there was recognition of the force of some of the contentions of structural realism - and an acknowledgement of the argument that the diminished role of nuclear weapons and the disappearance of bipolarity had allowed the reassertion of new forces for instability - pure structural realism had few adherents. There were two reasons for this. The first was an acknowledgment that domestic factors are important in Eastern Europe in determining whether or not the latent potential for instability is transformed into new conflicts, and in Western Europe in determining future security preferences of national governments. The second was the belief that European security and stability depend critically upon choices made by national governments and upon the institutional structures that will result from these decisions.

9. The future of the United States in Europe. Some participants contended that U.S. involvement and a U.S. presence were essential to the future stability of Europe. Others argued that the key role of balancing the Soviet Union was over and that the United States could not be expected to play nearly as significant a role in Europe as in the past 40 years. How much less of a role the United States would play was uncertain as was the pace of the U.S. retrenchment from Europe. What was perhaps most noteworthy was that this did not provoke sharp divisions between European and U.S. participants. The Europeans acknowledged that Western Europe had to become more self-reliant and agreed with their U.S. counterparts that while the transition

should be as managed and as smooth as possible, it was ultimately inescapable. There was less consensus on whether this meant simply a change in the internal balance of effort and responsibility in NATO or a shift away from NATO towards other security structures. This was something, however, on which both U.S. and European participants differed among themselves, albeit largely in terms of the time-frame involved.

This list of themes is, of course, not exhaustive. During the formal presentations and the discussions which followed, many other arguments and issues were addressed. Moreover, the debate over many of the issues summarized above was much richer and characterized by greater subtlety than a short account of this kind can really convey. Accordingly, the second part of this paper summarizes the presentations and highlights the main issues raised by the discussants and participants from the floor.

## **PART TWO**

### **THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS**

#### **I. THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

The discussion of the new security environment was introduced by John Mearsheimer who argued that the post-Cold War European security system is likely to be extremely messy and unstable, a position based partly on historical considerations and partly rooted in structural realism. In historical terms, there is a stark contrast between the pre-1945 world with two world wars and 50 million deaths, and the world as it existed from 1945 to 1990, a period of no major conflicts in Europe.

This is explained partly through structural realism, where the crucial determinant of conflict in the system is the distribution of power. The other part of the explanation concerns the nature of military power, with nuclear deterrence being more inhibiting than conventional deterrence. Before the Second World War there was a multipolar system and conventional deterrence; after the Second World War there was a bipolar, nuclear deterrence system. Now the international system is moving into a multipolar world in which there is also confusion about deterrence, a situation which John Mearsheimer regarded as highly dangerous, not the least because complexity and power imbalances offer more opportunities for states to miscalculate. On top of



this there are nonstructural factors still left unresolved by the Second World War, including blood feuds, nationalism, long memories of the killing machines and unresolved border disputes.

In moving from bipolarity to multipolarity, there will be power imbalances and increased conflict. Moreover, if Europe becomes a nuclear-free zone, it will revert to a pre-World War Two system characterized by destabilizing conventional competition in which states strive for security and power. Historical memories will intensify the search for security through strength. This will apply not only to Poland but also to Germany, which will no longer be able to shelter under the United States' nuclear umbrella, yet will remain a front line state in terms of the chaos to the East. Germany will also have to deal with at least three nuclear powers in Europe. Consequently, it is very likely that Germany will, at some point, consider nuclear deterrence as a means of achieving security in the new Europe. Should this occur in times of crisis, it could be particularly destabilizing. It might be better, therefore, to encourage Germany to acquire nuclear weapons in a period of relative tranquillity. In John Mearseimer's view, this would help ensure the maintenance of nuclear deterrence and, therefore, stability in post-Cold War Europe.

The discussion of John Mearsheimer's thesis was extremely vigorous and many aspects of his thesis were challenged. The remarks can be divided up into the following categories:

1. Diagnosis of the problem:

There was some agreement that post-Cold War Europe would be dangerous, but Paul Hammond argued that the problems will stem from vertical relationships as a collapsing empire precipitates resurgent nationalism, ethnic conflict, and the diffusion of technology. He also suggested that structural realism generated self-fulfilling prophecies, while missing opportunities that would be recognized by other approaches. In this connection, the institutions of collective security were believed by some to be stronger than Mearsheimer had acknowledged, with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe having a capacity to mitigate the effects of anarchy, and the United Nations - which was designed for the non-Cold War world - taking on added relevance.

2. The future of nuclear weapons:

Critics of Mearsheimer's argument contended that the idea of conventional deterrence replacing nuclear deterrence in Europe was not entirely persuasive. The Soviet Union of 1985-86 had featured a Gorbachev who sought a non-nuclear world by the year 2000. Since then Moscow had back-tracked. Following the display of U.S. conventional technology - and superiority - in the Gulf War, the prospect of a fully denuclearized Europe was no longer appealing to Moscow. Accordingly, a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence was combined with a desire to retain some U.S. nuclear forces in Europe to help restrain a new, powerful Germany.

While NATO might facilitate this in the short-term, NATO's primary importance is that it will allow time for the phasing in of other alternatives. Steven Maaranen suggested that the most appropriate alternative would be pursuit of a European-centered security union - that is, bringing the U.K., France, and Germany into a security alliance. The key is incorporating Germany into the security arrangement and involving it in force planning and command and control. There must also be agreement on what nations are protected under the nuclear shield. This means the UK and France extending nuclear deterrence for Germany and all of Europe.

Another theme which developed was that the demand for nuclear weapons by Germany and other European states can all too easily be exaggerated. States sometimes seek to avoid power and responsibility rather than to maximize them. Hegemonic stability theory, which is based upon the notion that hegemons are entrepreneurs or organizers of power, recognizes that states are often willing to put up with stronger states to escape the burden of responsibility. The relevance of this was that Germany may well want to avoid the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Closely related was the suggestion that arguments about Germany wanting nuclear weapons were cast in terms of false consciousness. There are no constituencies for the acquisition of nuclear weapons in Germany or in Poland, where the debate is over reform, economic growth, and immigration, not over nuclear weapons. The counter-argument was that the transition from a bipolar world is NOT complete. Germany will not talk about nuclear weapons with Soviet troops in its back yard, but as these troops are withdrawn the inhibitions will be removed. As the security structure changes, attitudes will change in fundamental ways and such constituencies might appear. Finally, it was suggested that this should not be encouraged, and that sensitivity to German concerns for security should not obscure the concerns of other European governments about Germany becoming a nuclear power. In response, John Mearsheimer argued that the Germans have been insecure aggressors and that nuclear weapons will make them more secure.

## **II. THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE**

The second session of the conference focused on the future of the Soviet Union and of Eastern Europe. The discussion on the Soviet Union was introduced by Jeffrey Checkel. Jack Snyder followed with a presentation on security problems in Eastern Europe, while Jeffrey Simon focused on security problems.

Jeffrey Checkel argued that it was necessary to reappraise our attitudes towards a Soviet Union which still existed, *de jure*, but not *de facto*. He also suggested that the remnants of the Soviet Union will consist of a confederation of republics (in the loose, textbook definition of a confederation) - with a narrow set of common policies centering on foreign and defense issues. Moreover, to understand the detailed foreign policy behavior of the republics, it was necessary to

look at key analytical categories: (1) institutional change; (2) change in decision-making policy; and (3) the supply of ideas for policy.

In terms of institutional change, there is an ongoing proliferation of institutions in the republics - in the executive and in the democratic legislative branches of the new governments. The key to this institutional change will be "brain power." Where are the republics going to get the people to perform all of the functions once handled by the Soviet government? Russia has all the personnel with experience in foreign and defense policy. The security policy stratum of the old Soviet Union resides in the Russian Republic, while the other states have little. This means that the leaders of the republics will be the dominant decision makers. One of the difficulties in this confused situation is the "signal to noise" problem. Do particular statements reflect official policy or are they personal or institutional?

Although the republics are undergoing a massive decentralization, the lack of expertise will put a brake on this. In the early stages, other republics will have to follow Russia's lead. The difficulty is that, institutionally, there is a loss of decision-making personnel, while the opening of the domestic economy to a market capital system will draw away the brightest people.

One of the implications is that we should not expect decisions similar to those made on Cuba, Afghanistan, and the Kurile Islands. These happened because the institutional structure is in flux, and the personal policies of individuals like Yeltsin have immediate influence. In the future, however, there will be more "sticky decision-making." Indeed, the interplay between the leaders and key individuals should be a major focus of attention in the next few years. Although the Soviet Union has subsequently ceased to exist, many of Jeffrey Checkel's points are equally relevant to the Commonwealth of Independent States which has been formed. Indeed, the problem of expertise is one that will be endemic in the new states.

Jack Snyder focused his remarks on the issue of nationalism, which is the main source of instability in Europe. He suggested that there are two forms of nationalism: (1) the intermingling type of nationalism, where multiple nationalities hold claims over statehood which are mutually exclusive (Serbs and Croats, Armenians and Izaris); and (2) the great power form of nationalism when one ethnic group, already ruling in a powerful state, believes that it has the right, obligation, or need, to conquer other nationalities which are seen as inferior regardless of states' rights. German Nationalism in the 1930s was of this kind, but so far there seems to be little of this in post-Cold War Europe.

In relation to the problems posed by nationalism, Snyder suggested that there was some good news. The chauvinist type candidates have been getting only about 7 per cent of the vote in Russia - riding on anti-semitism - and are not a major force. Indeed, Yeltsin's concern has been with the intermingling nationalism in the Baltics and the granting of citizenship rights to the

ethnic Russians. Citizenship rights are of great importance as 60 million Russians live outside their traditional republic. The other good news is that intermingling nationalism tends to be self-limiting. Nationalism, once it has its territory, stops.

Snyder also suggested that there are three main causes of nationalism: primordial, rational, and manipulative. The key element in primordial nationalism is that group consciousness and togetherness is reinforced by myths about the common past. Primordial myths have been a key element in shaping national consciousness in Eastern Europe, especially where ethnic boundaries did not conform to state boundaries. Although primordial nationalism with its obsessions with past wrongs and sacred lands can cause intractable problems, the primordial conflicts have only a limited potential for disrupting the broader security of Europe. The bad news, however, is that rational calculations can lead to John Mearsheimer's concept of "hyper-nationalism." The nexus is: (1) the experience of war; (2) the threat of war; and (3) the preparation for war. As Charles Tilly put it: War made the state, the state made war, and together they made nationalism. This could be particularly relevant to the Soviet republics which are in the process of creating states, armies, and allegiances. There are also rational economic reasons for the rise of nationalism. These are: (1) "Nationalism by default," where the old state collapses and people look elsewhere for their allegiances (in the republics this is ethnically based); and (2) what Ernest Gellner framed as the connection between industry, capitalist market economies, and nationalism. Wherever industrialization occurred, ethnic groups vied for the advantage of supplying the dominant culture to accompany and facilitate economic activity. The result was intensified nationalism. This is even more of a problem with the transition to a modern market economy which tends to increase inequalities among ethnic groups and may lead to a Darwinian war among the republics as they battle to provide the dominant culture.

In the final analysis, however, the rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is malleable in the sense that it responds to rational changes in economic and security incentives. Constructive Western policies, therefore, can help to contain or mitigate the effects of nationalism.

Jeffrey Simon focused his remarks on specific problems in Eastern Europe. He suggested two perspectives on disorder in the region: (1) the new internal threats; and (2) the external threats. Most of his remarks focused on the internal threats.

Internally, the first threat relates to political command and control of the military. Civil military problems could aggravate future relations and threaten the fragile Central European economic and political experiments nurtured by the revolutions of 1989. In this connection, although there is a clear movement toward civilian control of the military, areas of uncertainty remain. This is especially the case in Hungary where there are still problems regarding presidential versus parliamentary oversight of the military, particularly as these powers relate to

the employment of the armed forces and the transition to war. Major issues include delineation of national command authorities and their relationships to parliaments. Another problem is civilian control of defense ministries: not only does there have to be greater development of civilian expertise, but it is also necessary to subordinate the chiefs of staff and the military leaders to civilian authorities. In these areas, Czechoslovakia and Poland have made much greater progress than Hungary.

The second internal threat comes from cuts in defense budgets with consequent disenchantment, both among the professional officers corps and among conscripts - a process that could have serious implications for the future of democracy in Eastern Europe. In Poland, in particular, the military has already become isolated from the broader society, while in Czechoslovakia two unions have been created in the armed forces which have drawn support for Slovak separatism. In all three Central European states, military institutions have been undermined and pose potential threats to their own societies.

The third internal threat comes from the conversion of military industries to civilian industries. This has become an important security concern. The military industrial base has been a mainstay of the Central European economies, and downsizing could significantly increase unemployment which could, in turn, erode the social basis of support for new liberal democratic governments. In Czechoslovakia, most of the unemployment from downsizing the military industry has occurred in Slovakia, with the result that it has fueled Slovak separatism.

The fourth internal threat stems from economic insecurity. The economies of the three Central European countries have been given successive jolts by the collapse of the GDR, the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In addition, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia face major environmental problems, revolving around industrial waste and pollution, nuclear reactor safety, and the clean-up of former Soviet bases.

As regards external threats, there is even greater uncertainty because of the pace of change in the region. Two and a half years ago, concerns centered on boundaries and efforts to keep the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union together. The border issue has been mostly resolved, and the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have both disintegrated. Consequently, there are new anxieties relating to the Ukraine, nuclear forces, and possible German proliferation.

The subsequent discussion revolved around several key issues:

1. The future of the Soviet Union:

Some participants were skeptical about the idea of a loose confederation of states. Nor were they convinced that a lack of expertise will prevent the republics from making foreign policy decisions (albeit bad ones) on their own. The counterargument was that there are ties based on 70 years of togetherness which bind the empire and which still hold for defense policy issues. There was broad agreement, however, that this will be a minimal cooperation. What is perhaps most interesting is that developments since the conference - and especially the formation of the new commonwealth - are consistent with Jeffrey Checkel's ideas about a loose confederation, even though it is under Yeltsin's auspices rather than Gorbachev's and has superseded the Soviet Union.

## 2. The nature and impact of nationalism:

For the most part, Snyder's analysis of nationalism was widely accepted, although it was suggested that there was some overlap between the different types of nationalism, and that inward looking nationalism changes to outward looking once it reaches its borders. To the extent this was accepted, it underlined the problems posed by nationalism for future stability in Europe.

## 3. The inherent difficulties of developing the state in Eastern Europe:

It was suggested that in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, insufficient attention has been given (in the U.S. and elsewhere) to the requisites of democratic government. Indeed, there are basic problems such as drafting a constitution and working out the role of legislative oversight. Problems stemming from the novelty of these ideas are compounded by an overall lack of long-term planning in the civilian sector. In addition, there is linguistic isolation to contend with, with Central Europe now turning from Russian to European languages.

## 4. The importance of appropriate advice and assistance:

Great care has to be taken with economic assistance that is made conditional upon austerity and economic shock-treatment, conditions that are sometimes imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. The danger with shock-therapy economics is that it can radicalize nationalism and undercut democracy. Shock therapy worked fine in ethnically homogeneous Poland but could spark "hyper-nationalism" in the former Soviet republics. On the other hand, if external actors such as the IMF demand a central governmental role this can actually help the governments of the region by giving them a straw man to blame for the economic hardships caused by the transition.

### III. THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

The third session of the conference focussed on the dynamics of change in Western Europe. Presentations were made by Steven Szabo, Simon Reich, and Joseph Pilat.

The first presentation by Steven Szabo examined the impact of German reunification, with particular emphasis on continuity and change. In answering the question of whether unified Germany will simply be a big West Germany or something entirely new, Szabo suggested that it is necessary to look at the dialectic between domestic and international factors. In terms of domestic political culture, he argued that continuity will be the rule and that united Germany will simply be a big FRG because of the dominance of West German institutions, culture, and leadership. The problem with neo-Nazism in the East is best understood as a deviant occurrence, rather than a harbinger of future developments.

In terms of external considerations, the central issue is how the new Germany will behave internationally. Now that Germany is fully sovereign, will it remain post-national and willing to submerge its identity in the European Community? One issue, Szabo suggested, is clear - Germany will remain a nonnuclear state for at least 10 to 15 years, partly because of the external limits symbolized by the prohibition on nuclear weapons in the "two plus four" agreement and partly because of the internal limitation stemming from the absence of domestic support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

There has been a dramatic change in the perception of threat following the end of the Cold War. Concerns are now of an implosion of the Soviet Union rather than an explosion. Nuclear proliferation, economic collapse, and the movements of refugees are the primary German security concerns. With the disappearance of the Soviet military threat, the German tie to NATO is weakened. In an environment where refugees and immigrants are the most immediate threats, followed by ethnic conflict and events in the Middle East, Germany is no longer a front line state. Consequently, its relationship with the United States will change. Indeed, Szabo suggested that given the change in strategic geography it would not be surprising if, four to five years hence, Germany might decide that there is no need for NATO. Although Germany wants the United States commitment until Soviet troops are completely gone, the future European security architecture will feature a competition between NATO and the WEU/CSCE in which Germany will emphasize European institutions and downgrade NATO. This will contribute to a drifting apart in the American-German relationship, a process that will be accentuated as the United States supports a European pillar but not a bloc and gives domestic issues priority over foreign policy.

Szabo's final theme concerned the German stance on out-of-area issues. He argued that German deployment of forces abroad is a political rather than constitutional issue and one in which incremental change is the most appropriate option. The test case is likely to involve the WEU and will highlight the tension between German reluctance to commit forces abroad and its commitment to European institutions.

Simon Reich also dealt with the theme of a new Germany in a new Europe and identified two distinct approaches. He argued that there was an optimistic approach to Germany which focused on functional formulations, domestic structure, and sociological development. Functional formulations emphasize that in both security matters and issues of international political economy, German power is embedded in organizations such as WEU, NATO, and the EEC. In terms of domestic structures, the argument is that Germany is now a federal, liberal democratic, benign state which is virtually a more refined United States. The sociological dimension of the optimistic thesis is that there have been major changes in the elites and the bourgeoisie, and these can be understood in terms of "knowledge through learning."

The pessimists, in contrast, focus on the historical "German problem" and German centrality in the new Europe. They also tend to emphasize cultural elements which have traditionally encouraged expansionist policies - Volk, Wagner, and the Fatherland - and contend that now that Germany is free of constraints, these elements will come back to the fore.

Reich avoided both these positions, arguing instead that it is precisely because Germany is democratic and commercialized that it can exercise power without this being seen in any way as illegitimate. The change that Deutsch Marks might go much further than panzers in extending German power seems quite compelling. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that Germany already has a position of hegemony in Europe. This is likely to be consolidated in the future as Germany extends its influence to the East.

Simon Reich also contended that the new world is breaking up into three trading blocks with Germany as a hegemon in one. The EEC, he suggested, is now dominated absolutely and relatively by Germany - and one of the ironies is that other West Europeans seek to imitate Germany's success even though it has been at their expense. Moreover, Eastern Europe is historically closer to Germany than to the rest of Europe, and the East Europeans have overcome their traditional fear of Germany and seek to emulate the German model not only in terms of the economy, linguistics, and culture but also in ways to overcome authoritarianism and make progress toward liberal democracy.

The implication is that the traditional German question has been inverted. Germany now has the ability to expand, yet the elites decry this path. There is, rather, a hegemony of ideas, as the



mechanisms of German restraint have turned into the arms of German power. The Germans have achieved economic and political leadership by ability, not by volition. Although Germany did not set out to dominate Europe, it was the natural hegemon because of its position and economic power. At the same time, Simon Reich argued that it was important to avoid pressuring Germany to act in more assertive ways: the reluctance of Germany to deploy forces abroad was not "irresponsible," and if Germany wanted to be a big Austria or Switzerland, this should be encouraged.

The final paper in this session was given by Joseph Pilat, who looked at the relevance of arms control in a Europe in which the Cold War has ended and the military blocs have disappeared. Pilat argued that one of the central questions is how will the old arms control agenda - which was predicated on East-West confrontation - fare in this emerging new world? In response, he suggested that there is still considerable activity on the arms control front, with follow-on negotiations under way on both Conventional Forces Europe and Confidence and Security Building Measures, and the Open Skies negotiations back on track after breaking down in 1990. Moreover, the future arms control agenda is a rich one. Not everything on the old agenda was completed, while the political considerations that drove the CFE negotiations to a conclusion, after their original purpose was obviated by the changes in the East, are still powerful. As the East Europeans strive to guarantee their security in a dangerous world, and Europe seeks to establish a new security architecture, arms control may become even more significant. The search for a new arms control agenda, which will be taken up in Helsinki, will occur in the context of a dynamic world with newly emerging threats among more participants with a greater diversity of interests. As a result, it will be far more difficult than in the past.

Before looking to the future, however, Joseph Pilat offered an assessment of the CFE Treaty. Although CFE clearly lagged behind the pace of political change, Pilat argued that its implementation will probably bring significant benefits: it will help to make beneficial changes more difficult to reverse, provide predictability in the assessment of future threats, and enhance warning time for responding to these threats. CFE provides a solid framework for maintaining a cap on German military capabilities, for destroying large quantities of equipment, for facilitating transparency of the structure, size and disposition of forces in Europe, and for implementing verification provisions that will enhance national intelligence measures. As such it would help to mitigate some of the potential dangers highlighted by John Mearsheimer.

Despite these benefits, CFE is hardly likely to be the model for the future which, Pilat argued, will be more ambiguous and less susceptible to traditional arms control techniques, especially if the main threats stem from crises like Yugoslavia and out-of-area conflicts which could "spill over" into Europe. Consequently, the new agenda will have to address issues such as force reconstitution and defense conversion; deal with subregional tensions and conflicts through mediation, fact-finding, and peacekeeping efforts; focus on extra-regional issues, such as the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the mechanisms for managing these issues; promote transparency, predictability and openness; and ratify and legitimize unilateral (or possibly reciprocal) actions.

In conclusion, Joseph Pilat argued that there will not be a grandiose CFE II, and there are unlikely to be further formalized quantitative reductions. Nor will there be new qualitative reductions: these are impracticable and would undermine Western interests, which continue to depend on qualitative superiority of military capabilities, especially in a global context. Instead, the emphasis should be on promoting openness and transparency through multiple endeavors. This should be the highest priority for policy makers concerned about security and stability in the new Europe.

The discussion focused on several themes. The most salient was the kind of behavior that could be expected from the new Germany. Participants were divided about the dangers associated with a united Germany. Some participants disagreed with Simon Reich's argument, claiming that German acceptance of majority voting cast doubt on the notion of German domination of the European Community. Others saw the problem less in terms of hegemony and more in terms of German reluctance to play a constructive role, both in Europe and globally, commensurate with its power. The picture of Germany -reinforced by its attitude during the Gulf War - is one of a reluctant giant. In this view, there is a vacuum of leadership in Europe, especially with the U.S. role diminishing. The best situation would be one where Germany was willing to play a leadership role within the European Community framework. And regarding conflicts like Yugoslavia, Western Europe as a whole should take the lead, rather than leaving it to single nations.

Yet there was also an acknowledgement of some disquieting developments. One consequence of Germany's neighbors pushing it towards a more central role and creating expectations that cannot be met is that Germany is developing the habit of dismissing outside criticism. In addition, chauvinistic tendencies are becoming apparent even though Germany remains very cosmopolitan. There is also growing anti-Americanism, a trend for which there is no solution. German self-awareness is increasing, and Germans feel more comfortable in relationships with the Europeans than with the United States. Economically, this could develop into a repetition of the 1930s trading blocs, although this time there is an acceleration of foreign investment as opposed to the decline in foreign trade in the 1930s.

As for the military aspects of German power, one way to handle the German question would be aerial reconnaissance through open skies. If such arrangements were in place, this would obviate the need to develop something specifically for Germany and avoid a new form of "singularization." There was also agreement that Joseph Pilat's emphasis on transparency would be particularly important in stabilizing relations among the republics of the former Soviet Union.

The need for a more creative approach to arms control was also widely accepted, and it was felt that a focus on subregional arms control, a willingness to work through CSCE, and a fact-finding and peacekeeping capability tied in with the Conflict Prevention Center, would be positive moves.

## **IV. THE END OF NATO?**

In an after dinner address, Admiral Sir James Eberle considered whether NATO had come to the end of its useful life. He started from the proposition that for more than 40 years NATO had a clear and visible primary purpose - the defense of Western Europe against the threat of military aggression from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. The concomitant political aim was to break down the barriers between East and West in Europe.

With the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the disappearance of the Soviet threat, and the removal of the barriers between the two parts of Europe, NATO has achieved its primary purposes. Consequently, the question has to be asked, "Is this the end of NATO?" If not, then what is NATO's new purpose and how can it be fulfilled? Admiral Eberle suggested that these issues could not be separated from more fundamental questions about the effectiveness of military power and the role of alliances in the "new world order."

He argued that the utility of military power was changing and that the use of force was becoming less effective in achieving political goals. Even major conventional war was no longer an effective option for settling international disputes. In Eastern Europe, fundamental political change was achieved through "peaceful people power," while, in the Gulf War, military force simply changed the problem rather than solving it. Moreover, military power, while it still remained relevant, was important primarily in upholding the status quo.

Admiral Eberle subsequently turned his attention to global security. He argued that although the United States continues to exercise global leadership, it is unwilling to play the role of global policeman. In these circumstances, it is necessary to build a multilateral system of regional and global security and enforcement. Regional structures are crucial and their relationship with the United Nations will require careful consideration.

Against this background, Admiral Eberle focused on the security of Europe. He welcomed the development of CSCE, but pointed out that although CSCE has a major role to play in European security, it has little part to play in European defense. CSCE could not be regarded as a replacement for NATO, primarily because it commands no means of enforcement. Furthermore, the prospect of continuing uncertainty about the definition of the future "Europe" and its political

and economic structure, suggests a *raison d'être* for continuation of NATO as we have known it. The difficulty is that the continuation of the appearance of the existing security structure may not be sustainable at a time when the very basis of the threat to security has fundamentally changed. There is considerable risk that NATO will lose public support. This is not to downplay changes that have already been made in NATO. Nevertheless, there is a strong suspicion that there is more in NATO that is not changing than has changed.

One area that has not changed is NATO membership. The Alliance has resisted pressures to admit the states of Central Europe. This is partly because of the strength of the security guarantee provided by Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an attack on one will be considered an attack on all. The difficulty is that there will remain something of a security vacuum in Eastern Europe. This can only be filled by some new European coalition treaty arrangement. Such an idea, though, seems to strike at the heart of the concept of an Atlantic Alliance. Yet increasingly Atlantic security has to be defined in terms of European security.

In this connection, the European Community is playing a growing role: how the Community reacts to East European requests that it open its markets to East European goods will have important implications not only for economic stability, or the lack of it, in Eastern Europe, but ultimately for European security broadly defined. Even if it is possible to envisage a pan-European free trade zone throughout Europe, perhaps developed through the processes of CSCE as an agency of economic security, it is not realistic to imagine it being paralleled by a political community along the lines being developed in the EC. Consequently, what happens to defense and security? This question is all the more pertinent because the trend in Western Europe - despite strong pressure from Britain to regard the WEU as the bridge between NATO and the EC - is towards the WEU becoming the "variable geometry" defense and security arm of the European Community.

In these circumstances, Admiral Eberle suggested that there was a need for a new European Security Order. With the greatest threat to European security no longer the possibility of external attack, but of violent internal divisions under the pressures of growing nationalism and a continuing divide in economic prosperity, the emphasis traditionally placed on Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty (an attack on one is an attack on all) can be reduced. A new "NATO" Treaty would more appropriately be based on the fundamental commitment of European states to refrain from initiating armed attack against any other member state; and in the case that such action did occur, to take all action, including military action, necessary to restore the status quo ante, and to resolve the issue by peaceful negotiation. Such a treaty would have far greater impact and cohesion than a web of bilateral nonaggression pacts. It would be a revision of the basic NATO Treaty; would be open for signature by all independent European countries which were members of the CSCE; and would end NATO as we now know it. In this way, the new NATO

would become the defense arm of CSCE, in the same way that the WEU can become the defense arm of the European Community.

The new organization would carry forward many of the existing elements of NATO. It would be both a political and military alliance, with a strong military planning function. In the operational planning field, its attention would be devoted to peacekeeping contingencies and to disaster relief. It would have a skeleton operational command structure to permit the rapid deployment within Europe of small highly mobile multinational units. Not only would it develop common operational procedures and standards, but it would provide the basis for a European contribution to UN operations. The new organization would maintain a close relationship with the WEU and have an Atlantic dimension.

Admiral Eberle closed with the argument that although we are in a period of transition, we need to have some vision of the future. He saw his remarks as an attempt to construct the outline of a new security and defense order that is compatible with the political and economic development of a wider Europe within a new world order.

The discussion following the presentation was brief, but it was clear that some participants felt uncomfortable with this proposal. Others saw it as an imaginative recommendation, commensurate with the changes that have taken place in Europe.

## **V. CHANGES IN NATO STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY**

The second day began with a progress report by Air Vice Marshall Anthony A. E. Woodford on NATO's development of its new strategy, a commentary on this by Paul Hammond, and a presentation by Thomas Durell-Young on the changing command structure in NATO.

Air Vice Marshall Woodford argued that the new strategy was one of the most important developments in NATO since the adoption of flexible response and the Harmel Report in 1967. The new strategy is designed to respond to changes in the international environment and to ensure that NATO remains relevant to European security problems. He also emphasized that all 16 alliance nations, including France, had been working on the new document which - in keeping with the new emphasis on transparency in Europe - would be made public. Because the document it replaced - MC14/3 which included flexible response - has never been released, the magnitude of the change is unlikely to be fully appreciated.

In fact, the contrasts with flexible response are significant. One is in the way the "threat" is treated. The emergent strategy uses "threat" several times but only in a historical context. The

monolithic conception of threat has been replaced by a concept of security which acknowledges that military power is but one factor in a complex equation. The aim of the new strategy is to contribute to stability. Accordingly, the Soviet Union is not the sole focus. Although there is still a residual feeling that Russian forces represent the force level that NATO should be prepared to meet, the new strategy emphasizes peace, crisis management, and conflict resolution. The remnant of large conventional forces from Cold War Europe should be used for NATO's new crisis management responsibilities, which should reduce the chance of war and limit its scope. While acknowledging the need for these operational changes, Woodford argued - in a way which clearly differentiated his position from that of Admiral Eberle - that the wording of the North Atlantic Treaty, especially Articles Four and Five, remains valid. He also made clear that the new strategy refers to the European dimension of the defense debate, in effect, recognizing that Europe, as an increasingly powerful entity, has a distinct role to play.

Air Vice Marshal Woodford acknowledged that nuclear planning was causing the greatest problems, even though every state had participated in the discussions and all agreed that nuclear weapons, with their deterrent potential, continue to have a key role - although one that is increasingly being relegated to the background. While the stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe could be significantly reduced, the retention of some nuclear weapons on the Continent was of crucial importance.

Another contrast between MC14/3 and the new strategy concerned forward defense. The worry about forward defense has disappeared, except in Norway and Turkey, and the new approach emphasizes forward presence instead of forward defense and sets out a force structure to go with it. This new force structure consists of Main Defense Forces, Reaction Forces, and Augmentation Forces in the maritime, land and air arenas. It takes into account future defense plans and the desire for a peace dividend, while ensuring that NATO will be able to react in a properly measured way in the early stages of a crisis. The assumption is that if NATO has trouble assuming responsibility for crises, no other organization will step in; hence, the emphasis on rapid response capabilities. With sharp reductions in active forces, the state of training and equipment become even more crucial.

Emphasis is also placed on multinationality, which will be achieved at the corps level. This is designed to enhance Alliance cohesion, especially in crises. From the NATO military perspective, however, there were concerns over the peace dividend being cashed in without appropriate consideration of the implications of dropping forces below the level allowable under the CFE Treaty.

The change of approach was underlined because the newly democratic states want NATO and find it reassuring. NATO's new focus on coercive actions in Europe gives Eastern Europeans what some of them regard as an implicit guarantee that they would like to see formalized.

Woodford emphasized, however, that the move away from exclusive preoccupation with Soviet capabilities does not mean that NATO is looking for a new *raison d'être*. Nor does the new strategic document specifically discuss the membership question. The newly democratic states remain out-of-area.

In conclusion, Woodford suggested that the new strategy acts as a bridge to enduring elements of the previous strategy while embracing a broader definition of security. It is an attempt to deal with uncertainty through the acknowledgement that small military forces remain important.

In commenting upon Air Vice Marshall Woodford's presentation, Paul Hammond emphasized NATO's commitment to change, which, he suggested, highlighted the utility of existing institutions. Certain NATO functions remain, especially the control of German military power - which requires continued United States involvement. Other West European organizations cannot substitute for NATO because the United States is not a member. Moreover, it is not just Washington that wants the United States to have a forum in Europe; NATO has a strong underlying constituency among its members, even France. NATO is also important in Eastern Europe, where the newly emerging democracies find the organization familiar and secure.

This is not to preclude the creation or development of other institutions. Indeed, Paul Hammond suggested that the United States should not become so committed to defending NATO that it isolates itself: relationships between institutions should grow and the United States should look for new institutions. He also argued that the United States should avoid over commitment and should not bear burdens alone, especially the nuclear burden. Standing back and sharing responsibility was likely to be acceptable in Washington.

At the same time, there had to be a recognition of how states are often willing to subordinate themselves when they obtain security benefits by doing so. Yet they play extremely complex games in which patterns of subordination are not apparent. Seen in this way, the United States may find it very difficult to withdraw its power from Europe. The United States is dependent on NATO in the sense that NATO symbolizes U.S. commitments abroad. So while change has to occur, and is occurring, there is considerable investment in current institutions which should not be condemned or discarded too quickly.

Thomas Durrell Young, the third member of the panel, argued that we are in a period of fundamental change, requiring the Atlantic Alliance to review its most basic security precepts. The departure of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and the collapse of the threat compel change in existing military structures. Failure to achieve this could erode the political legitimacy of the Alliance among its members because of its military irrelevance to the emerging security environment. If NATO can not make the appropriate changes, alternatives are available.

A major area that needs reform is the command structure--a politically sensitive issue and one on which there is little sign of progress. Durell-Young focussed on the challenges facing the present structure, the short-term responses, and the longer-term options. He did not focus on the most senior command positions, but on the Main Supporting Commands. Driving the changes will be the process of statal disintegration and the alteration of borders, a process that has resulted in an ambiguous threat environment.

The main changes will come in the AFCENT region, where it will be difficult to maintain readiness levels and engage in large scale maneuvers. There will have to be a streamlining of the force structure for new missions, emphasizing mobilization and reinforcement. At the same time, the move from 8 to 5 allied army corps in the AFCENT region and the move towards multinationality of ground forces will present major but not insuperable problems.

Another factor impinging on this region will be the move by the Federal Republic to nationalize parts of its defense capability. New command structures related to defense of the five new Laender in the East will give Germany the capability to conduct independent army operations above the corps level.

Changes in the German structure also have implications for Allied Forces North (AFNORTH). There are concerns in Norway that AFNORTH's area of responsibility might be cut off from the Central Region, and that Norway will be increasingly isolated at a time when Soviet forces in the North have actually increased.

In relation to Allied Forces South, planning has to consider possible threats from North Africa. This is taking place, but should be accompanied by a rethinking of current command structures and a move towards more functional arrangements.

Durell-Young also noted the continued difficulties in establishing the command structure for the Rapid Reaction Corps and suggested that by degrading NATO's capacity to engage in effective crisis management, the future relevance of the Alliance could be undermined. For the transition to more appropriate command structures to be successful, it had to meet immediate needs and future requirements.

Discussion after the presentations revolved around a few key issues. There was a suggestion that the defense perimeter tacitly extends to Poland and Czechoslovakia. It was made clear, however, that NATO has not promised to defend Eastern Europe, although the East Europeans themselves would like to have such guarantees. NATO has the capacity to improvise in the event of a crisis in Eastern Europe, but this falls far short of an iron clad guarantee. Nor was there much enthusiasm from the presenters for any extension of formal guarantees. They also made clear that



in the event of a crisis among the former Soviet republics such as Ukraine and Russia, the situation would be discussed at a political level in NATO, but that NATO had neither the capability nor the inclination to deal with such contingencies. Nevertheless, the very existence of an institution like NATO, which meets regularly and has trust among its members and in its procedures, allows for some discrete planning and provides a sound basis for improvisation.

Among the other issues discussed was the possibility of consultations between NATO and the UN. Although there is a skeleton there on which something could be developed, nothing has so far been done.

The session finished with a discussion of continuity and change in European domestic politics. The general sentiment of the panel was that this would not lead to major changes. A Social Democratic Government in Germany and a Labor Government in Britain would face the same problems and cost constraints as their predecessors and, consequently, will accept more of NATO and the U.S. presence than their rhetoric suggests. Although there could be some pressure for further change in nuclear doctrine, on the whole, the left would not be much harder for the United States to deal with than the European governments of the past 20 years.

## **VI. PERSPECTIVES ON EVOLVING EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS**

The next session focused on European perspectives on the evolving security arrangements in Europe, with James Sperling discussing Germany, Robbin Laird focusing on France, Stuart Croft dealing with Britain, and Dr. Willem van Eekelen offering a perspective from the Western European Union.

James Sperling emphasized the changing definition of security in Germany, and the concerns that Germany had over ethnic implosions in Eastern Europe, German control of its own borders, terrorism by foreigners, and the perseverance of the European market-based system. He suggested that the Germans increasingly think of themselves as a civilian power: the military is no longer important and demilitarization is the goal. Throughout the post-War period Germans have defined their interests in regional not national terms and are anxious to avoid power politics. They do not want to have to assert German power because it would threaten their neighbors. Consequently, Germany wants institutionalized security organizations and recognizes that each of the existing organizations has a different constituency. In NATO the main constituency is the United States; in CSCE it is Moscow and Eastern Europe; and in the European Community and the WEU it is the states of Western Europe. Efforts to maintain these institutions and create an institutional basis of security are based on two assumptions: peace comes when Germany's

interests are tied to its neighbors; and NATO has provided the longest period of peace in European history. For Germany, different institutions have different but complementary functions. NATO stabilizes Europe, prevents U.S. isolationism, and provides a measure by which to judge other institutions. It is central to the success of CSCE. For its part, CSCE ties security of the East to the West and creates the basis for future economic integration. The European Community, however, is the main basis of the German strategy for Europe, providing a bridge to the proto-capitalist Eastern European states. In addition, the Community provides for common immigration and terrorism laws and also shows that Germany renounces unilateral nationalism.

The French debate was analyzed by Robbin Laird who opened his remarks by suggesting that there was too much complacency in thinking about the future. While the Bush Administration was espousing global democratic development, this may not provide a new paradigm for international relations after the Cold War. There are question marks over the future of liberal democracy in Western Europe, with key states suffering paralysis of decision-making. Moreover, there are considerable differences about dealing with Eastern Europe, and it is not certain that the European Community will remain viable if it cannot deal with Eastern Europe. Immigration is a fundamental problem and one that, unless managed properly, could shake the foundations of the Western European system.

France can be understood as a generic example of the problems facing Western Europe in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, France is facing a "national identity crisis," partly because, economically, it will soon be passed by Italy, which has less centralization and is better suited for economic growth.

In terms of French security, there is clearly a need for restructuring based on foreign policy changes and domestic problems and priorities. Although France, in effect, accepted German unification 10 years before it happened, there are still concerns over whether Germany will be cooperative, competitive, or simply immobilized. Another major influence on French thinking about security was the Gulf War, where the inadequacy of French forces had profound and disconcerting implications. The resulting debate involves central issues such as the role of the military and the role of deterrence. Moreover, it comes against a background of domestic economic problems which will severely affect the military budget and the French arms industry. There is an added irony here: traditionally France has sold arms on the international market, and cut backs in domestic procurement will make this market even more important at a time when the market itself is shrinking. Under these circumstances, the French arms industry will survive only through foreign partnerships in arms production or subsidies. Subsidies are forbidden but the French government could find ways to cheat. In a sense, the debate is part of a larger debate about the economy and whether France should adhere to a liberal conception emphasizing competitiveness or should become more protectionist.

Against this background of domestic crisis and international change, it is likely that the main elements of French military strategy will alter. In particular, the classic French reliance on nuclear weapons will be down-played, and resources will be shifted to intelligence and space. At the same time, some of the changes will be hidden by doing things through the WEU. French conventional forces will be reconfigured for rapid deployment. Yet, there is also a sense of frustration in French attempts to find partners for certain things. The French want to develop missiles with Britain, and they want to have a rapid reaction force with Germany. As far as Germany is concerned, the goal is to get the Germans to lead responsibly.

In addition, Robbin Laird suggested that although the French experience had some unique aspects, there were four areas where this experience could be generalized. First, restructuring has merged as a debate over how small to go for most NATO members, not silly France. Second, a major task faced by France and its allies is to revalidate collective defense. Although the major political forces in the West see the benefit of sustaining NATO, they must dramatically reemphasize its role while also providing some political validation of the use of force. The third area where the French experience is part of a wider issue concerns the balance between national and alliance responsibilities, an issue which is related to the possibility that re-nationalization of defense policies will occur, if only by default. Each Ministry of Defense is putting into effect defense plans for domestic reasons and then trying to justify this by referring to the collective agreement. The problem is that such an approach is not only out of phase with the requirements of European construction but could become an impediment to it. The fourth issue-what defense forces are for - must be addressed not only by France but also by the allies, especially as it is central to the future of Europe. All these issues come down to a debate on interdependence and nationalism and, in this connection, it is clear that Mitterrand is trying to leave a legacy of multilateralism.

The third presentation, by Stuart Croft, offered a perspective on the British approach largely in terms of British domestic politics and the legacy of Thatcherism. Croft suggested that this was particularly important in the context of Britain's relations with Western Europe, where it was possible to discern three periods since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The first period, from the fall of the Wall to the fall of Thatcher, was one of trauma where many of the bases of British foreign policy collapsed. There was British hostility to the speed and idea of German unification, anxiety over the U.S.-German relationship, and trouble finding European friends. This was followed by a period of recovery. When John Major became Prime Minister, the need to reestablish relationships with European countries was clearly acknowledged. Accordingly, British policy changed significantly, with considerable emphasis on reestablishing a positive Anglo-German relationship. The third period has involved the testing of new relationships. It is not clear that Britain can maintain its balancing act of moving towards a

closer relationship with Europe without becoming so intertwined that Parliament removes its support.

The period of political change has really exacerbated the tensions in the Conservative party between pro- and anti- European factions. On the other side, the Labour party has been forced by Thatcher's electoral successes of the 1980s into reexamining its foreign and security policies. As a result, the party has abandoned its anti-nuclear stance and become much warmer toward European cooperation in general and the European Community in particular.

As regards NATO, there has been a convergence of support by both parties. There is also a consensus that the influence of Western Europe on Eastern Europe is extremely limited. This goes hand-in-hand with a fear of peacekeeping roles that could entangle British forces in situations from which it would be difficult to escape. In this connection, Yugoslavia is seen as much worse than Northern Ireland. Closely related is the debate over political union, which has produced a consensus that the European Community should not have a security role. Such a role could destroy the domestic consensus. Nor should there be a role for the European commission in the security area. Supra-nationalism is a loss of sovereignty.

Croft suggested that there were four main conclusions from the British debate. First, a consensus exists that zones of security and insecurity in Europe will remain. Security exists in Western Europe, while there is almost nothing the West can do to alleviate insecurity in Eastern Europe. The most enduring questions are ethnic and, as such, cannot be acted on by the U.K. Second, security can be achieved through intergovernmental not supragovernmental arrangements. Third, intergovernmental approaches of this kind facilitate a continued U.S. role. Finally, on all these issues there is a consensus in Britain, a growing agreement where there once was vigorous debate.

The final perspective in this session was offered by Dr. Willern van Eekelen, the Secretary-General of the Western European Union. Dr. van Eekelen began by noting that defense is no longer the overriding dimension in the trans-Atlantic relationship. Accordingly, trans-Atlantic relations must be nurtured more carefully than in the past, when common defense requirements dampened the friction over other issues. He then discussed the institutions of European security.

The tour d'horizon of European security institutions started with CSCE, which Dr. van Eekelen saw as dealing with the "two Ps:" principles of conduct and prevention of conflict. He saw CSCE as having little hope of stopping conflict when it occurs. Nor is there much of a role for CSCE economically, because the European Community is so attractive by comparison. NATO, in contrast, deals with "the two Ds": collective defense and deterrence. For the United States, the crucial link with Europe is NATO. But while NATO is adapting fairly well, its new

doctrine might not get broad support unless there is a clear sense of purpose and of relevant contingencies. In this connection, a new "trans-Atlantic bargain" is essential. Together, the United States and Europe must redefine the role of defense forces and what they are prepared to contribute. Closely related to this is the European pillar approach. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd has explicitly stated that NATO needs a European pillar, and Dr. van Eekelen agreed that a new basis is needed for the transAtlantic relationship. He also contended this could best be established within NATO, which remains the bridge between the United States and Europe. NATO, however, does have a problem in the lack of a common foreign policy among its members. There is consultation, but not vigorous direction.

After discussing NATO, Dr. van Eekelen turned his attention to European integration, arguing that this will remain incomplete until the defense and foreign policy dimensions are worked out. Until this is achieved in the European Community, the WEU should provide the security dimension on a transitional basis (recognizing that this raises important issues of membership and role). There are important practical functions for the WEU, which cannot be limited to acting as a think tank. Rather, the focus should be on operational capabilities and responsibilities. These include the development of a capability for verification of arms control, where emphasis could be placed upon open skies. In a similar vein, satellite capabilities and photo analysis are crucial to security as was highlighted by the Gulf War. European countries should acquire such capabilities, which could be operated by a WEU agency. In deciding, on 27 June 1991, to set up a satellite data interpretation center, WEU Ministers made a significant first step in this direction. Most important, it was necessary to have a European capability for dealing with security problems. This would enhance the sense of community and cooperation in Western Europe. West European reaction forces can also deal with East European scenarios, which NATO is institutionally unable to do.

Dr. van Eekelen also addressed U.S. objections to the WEU. He discussed the Bartholomew telegram which listed every possible argument against WEU and had a devastating effect, not least because it made the United States look dishonest by saying it supported union and then objected to it. Although the position was redressed by the five principles of Secretary Baker, the episode had left a bad taste. The telegram argued that contingencies in Eastern Europe must be dealt with in NATO, and that the European allies should not act as a group, as this would marginalize the United States. This was certainly not the aim of the WEU. Indeed the worry was rather the opposite-that there is continued uncertainty about how the U.S. position towards Western Europe is going to develop.

Finally, Dr. van Eekelen argued that the WEU rather than NATO was the critical institution in containing Germany, since the key restrictions were established in the WEU framework. He was also concerned that an emphasis on NATO as the instrument for German containment could

lead to a German reaction against NATO. More generally, there was a danger of creating self-fulfilling prophecies when dealing with the new Germany.

The discussion revolved around several themes: The first concerned what Western Europe could do for Eastern Europe. There was a broad consensus that Western Europe must open its markets to East European products. While this might ease some of the difficulties in Eastern Europe, it was also necessary to go beyond this and promote stability through involvement. Otherwise, there could be a strengthening of antidemocratic movements in the East.

Closely related to this was the issue of deepening versus widening the Community. It was suggested that many of those who advocate widening the EC want to prevent deepening. At the same time, other participants argued that although the Community's preference for deepening was understandable, from a defense perspective, widening was preferable as it would help to avert the danger that the newly independent Eastern European countries will not become democracies. The counterargument was that European Union had started not as an East-West problem but as a European-Japanese-U.S. problem, and that without further deepening there would be problems in what the European Community could really do. It was important to help Eastern Europe, but full membership for the Eastern European states was not an appropriate solution. The real issue is how present members can reinforce integration.

There were also some spirited exchanges about containing Germany. While acknowledging that this must be discussed carefully, some participants believed that NATO was still the crucial institution in controlling Germany via the U.S. presence on German soil, a presence which reassures the Europeans and the Germans. If control of Germany is not discussed, it could become a greater problem. It was also noted that the restrictions placed on the German development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, when Germany entered NATO through the WEU, were still in place. Only the quantitative restriction on German conventional forces had been removed.

## **VII. RESPONDING TO OUT OF AREA AND EASTERN EUROPE CONTINGENCIES**

The seventh session focused on out-of-area issues, with presentations by Michael Brenner and Douglas Stuart and commentaries by Jack Snyder, Robbin Laird, Willem van Eekelen, and, more extensively, by Ambassador James Goodby.

Michael Brenner suggested that the nature of out-of-area problems has changed, but that the issue reveals states of mind and patterns of behavior which have great relevance for our idea of

the alliance. Although "out-of-area" is where the action is, Brenner suggested that the term has become a misnomer - with the disintegration of the Soviet Union a more appropriate term is "out-of-function." This refers to threats which do not stem from the traditional East-West conflict and are not, therefore, related to the underlying purpose of the Atlantic Alliance. What is encompassed under this heading is influenced not only by geography, but by relevance to NATO's traditional focus. Seen in this way, the Yugoslav conflict falls into the same class of crises as the Persian Gulf.

The Gulf crisis revealed a lot of fissures in the Alliance, despite broad agreement on the seriousness of the conflict and the threat to interests. Without the United States, the West would not have been able to respond militarily, which was the most viable option. Not surprisingly, old habits resurfaced, with the United States acting unilaterally and then consulting allies. On the other side, the manifest inadequacy of the European military contribution was compounded by a lack of unity and by divergent European policies. Consequently, there was an imbalance between military and economic power, with the United States proving unable to fulfil its role economically. The discrepancy between stakes and responses also provoked demands for a more sustainable reconfiguration of Alliance responsibilities, duties, and costs. In particular, what conditions would have to be met for Western Europe to become an equal partner of the United States?

Yugoslavia sheds light on this question. The Yugoslav situation gave Europeans the chance to redeem themselves. This time U.S. interests and participation were absent. Yet there were severe difficulties faced by Western Europe. Most obviously, this was its orchestral debut, but the Community has no orchestrator, only concert masters who replace one another. Even accepting this caveat, however, there were several aspects of the Community's approach which weakened its performance. These included a highly procedural approach to the cease-fire and mediation, as well as a very ahistorical approach which ignored the traditional enmity between the ethnic groups. This resulted in a style of mediation which avoided the core issues, a conciliation service rather than aggressive brokering, and the assumption that there was a "right answer" which could restore the underlying equilibrium. These failings highlight the inexperience of the Community in working as a collective body dealing with messy, morally ambiguous situations. There are intrinsic difficulties in pursuing an activist policy among 12 different independent members. Success, however, depends on making multilateralism sustainable and credible. This, in turn, requires frankness about what actors expect, what they want, and what they are prepared to offer.

It would be a mistake, therefore, to conclude either that the Europeans cannot become more self-reliant and effective or that United States is destined always to lead the West. There are more appropriate lessons to be drawn from the crisis. The first is that the Community has crossed a threshold in its efforts to deal with Yugoslavia and will assume greater responsibilities in its own back yard. Second, having gone through a major learning experience, the Europeans will be

better prepared for such contingencies in the future. Third, the Community was ahead of itself in the sense that unity of action depends on unity of analysis. Fourth, the problem is not only finding the right instruments but also the right policy. Finally, Michael Brenner noted that his most critical comments were not meant to disparage the Community, nor to deny that it should be better able to handle the next situation.

Douglas Stuart also dealt with out-of-area issues, discussing them primarily in relation to NATO but making clear that other institutions were also relevant. Since there have been more than 30 out-of-area crises since 1949, tracing them provided an excellent way to assess changes in the international system and in NATO.

For the first half of the period, out-of-area issues dealt with colonial problems, revealing each state's perspective on these problems. From the 1960s onwards, out-of-area disputes centered around threat assessment and burden-sharing, highlighting the divergences between the United States and Europe. The endemic problems in NATO on such issues, however, does not mean that the Alliance is going to dissolve. Indeed, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait concentrated the minds of those who wondered about NATO's disappearance with the end of the Cold War. During the crisis, NATO facilitated analysis and consultation and contributed to a swift and united reaction, with 12 NATO members participating in hostilities against Iraq. Although the crisis helped give birth to the Rapid Response Force, any attempt to revise Article Six of the Treaty, with its geographical limits, would be ill advised: NATO could lose the good in pursuit of the best. At the same time, it is clear that the United States and Europe could comfortably share responsibility. In both the Gulf and Yugoslav crises, there has been gradual and noncontroversial movement towards burden-sharing.

In terms of the other institutions, Douglas Stuart suggested that fostering the European Community and the WEU was not inconsistent with maintaining NATO. The WEU can be a bridge between NATO and the EC. He also suggested that the European Community has to accord highest priority to widening, because economic disarray in Eastern Europe is the greatest security threat. Moreover, by extending its boundaries past Germany, the European Community can also ease concerns over Germany in the East. Nor should CSCE be ignored. On the contrary, the United States should take the lead in the CSCE, which is the only existing organization that includes Eastern and Western Europe and the United States. It is also the organization for the protection of human rights which, along with conflict resolution and economic integration, is a priority for the new Europe.

Jack Snyder, in commenting on the out-of-area issue, suggested that war in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union could spur migration, nationalization, militarization, and antidemocracy movements. In these circumstances, he suggested that NATO might pursue its out-of-area interests through military deterrence and alliances, especially to support victims of



aggression. To do this, NATO should extend security commitments to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia when they become fully democratic. The West should use its political power to promote the emergence of a liberal world order. The logic is "If you become like us we will protect you." The drawback is that without full support now, the West would be constrained in the future if these states are attacked by hostile powers. The danger of miscalculation could also arise as is evident from the Korean experience. Dean Acheson's statement that South Korea was outside the United States defense perimeter created a dangerous situation: the North Koreans attacked and the United States ended up defending the South.

Robbin Laird suggested that we are in a new phase of human history which is not yet fully understood. There is not only considerable confusion, but much of our thinking is outmoded. Concepts like Eastern or Western Europe are based on 40 years of cold war, not on current realities. Security issues need to be put in the new context. He also argued that in the West the political legitimacy of the use of force is now in question: only the French and British have continued to fight wars; the Germans have not fought since the Second War World. The result is that every time out-of-area problems arose, there have been bitter and divisive debates.

Willem van Eekelen argued that the tragedy of Europe is how out-of-phase the East and the West are. Western Europe has moved towards integration; while in the East, previously suppressed divisions are now reviving. Because we are still thinking in East-West terms we still think primarily of collective defense, but scenarios related to this are becoming remote. Faced with intervention rather than defense, Europeans are having trouble adjusting. As regards the Gulf crisis, vital European interests were at stake and Western Europe acted strongly by deploying 39 ships to enforce the embargo. The question remains - What should we do about future scenarios like the Gulf crisis? There must be means to act. Double hatting of forces under NATO and under the WEU would be appropriate. Had Western Europe had an intervention force ready, its efforts in Yugoslavia would have been more credible.

The final discussant, Ambassador James Goodby, noting that the term out-of-area principally referred to the Middle East, suggested that it is unlikely that the United States and Europe will agree about policies for out-of-area challenges. Eastern Europe, however, currently provides a serious and perhaps typical example of future challenges. Central and Eastern Europe will remain relatively unstable and incidents will occur which may invite the use of force. Yugoslavia has already demonstrated this point. The crucial questions, therefore, are: Can such conflicts be prevented, contained or resolved? Is there a role for the collective authorization and use of military force in dealing with them? Should the United States become involved?

In response, Ambassador Goodby argued that intervention in civil wars carries great risks and should generally be avoided. International peacekeeping forces may be necessary, however, to help contain conflicts within the borders of the affected state. Furthermore, there might be

requests from the parties for peacekeeping forces. The unwillingness of the majority of states concerned with the crisis in the Balkans to consider this option is sensible, but means that the new world order in Europe will ultimately be lacking one essential precondition. In fact, the conflict in Yugoslavia has established a number of unhelpful precedents, especially the unwillingness of the Europeans to use the CSCE mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes. This reluctance was heightened when the Soviet Union threatened a general war in the event of intervention. Against this background, the French saw Yugoslavia as a good opportunity to show that the European Community could take on responsibility for defense and deal with the problem in a constructive way. The lead role taken by the European Community is also an example of the United States delegating European security issues to the Europeans themselves. The difficulty is that the Community is not yet totally defined either in terms of membership or function. While efforts made by the Community's emissaries to Yugoslavia have been intensive and ingenious - they have, by and large, been ignored by Serbia.

The one method that has not been tried is that of sending armed peacekeeping units to Croatia to defend both Serbs and Croats. Although this was discussed in September 1991, Britain strongly opposed it and the idea was dropped in favor of strengthening a 200 strong civilian observer force. As a test for the Community, Yugoslavia has not gone particularly well. Yet it seems unlikely that NATO would be willing to use its forces, while in the UN, a key European nation, Germany, would be omitted from the decision-making process in the Security Council. With this in mind, Ambassador Goodby returned his attention to the CSCE in Europe. While the present deficiencies in CSCE render it close to useless in dealing with foreseeable contingencies, he suggested ways in which its capacity to contribute more significantly might be improved. These included a move from the unanimity rule to authorization of peacekeeping through majority voting - but only when the disputants themselves requested armed peacekeeping operations. In addition, contingency planning in the Conflict Prevention Center should be authorized so that CSCE participants can consider issues relevant to the use of military forces in crisis situations. These include authority to send and receive forces, national origin of forces, command arrangements, and readiness status.

In conclusion, Ambassador Goodby argued that the involvement of the United States in maintaining peace in Central and Eastern Europe is essential to long-term stability. In the case of Yugoslavia, the evidence of traditional divergences of view among Germany, France, and Britain on Eastern European issues has been clear. CSCE gives the United States an institutionalized voice on all European issues and provides a fulcrum for the weight of the United States to lever Europe from indecision to action. Priority, therefore, must be assigned to the task of giving CSCE peacekeeping functions and capabilities.

In the brief discussion which followed, several voices were raised about the dangers in out-of-area contingencies. It was emphasized that the perceptions and judgements of the peoples

who live "out- of-area" should not be overlooked. Iran, for example, views intervention as arrogance, while Saddam Hussein used a phrase that has caught on all over the Middle East which refers to the U.S.-Atlantic-Zionist Alliance, reinforcing the notion that Islam continues to be threatened. It is essential to avoid a spiral of misperception in which the Arab states become the enemies of the West. Reinforcing this was the argument that in the post-Cold War world the temptations to engage in military interventions have increased. During the Cold War, temptations were always tempered because of the dangers of provoking conflict with the Soviets. With this constraint removed, the ability to act with impunity creates grave dangers of its own.

## **VIII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES**

The final session had three speakers - Jed Peters, Lawrence Kaplan, and Joseph Kruzel - who addressed the implications for the United States of changes in Europe, an issue which had already been raised at several junctures in the conference.

The opening speaker was Lieutenant Colonel Jed Peters who argued that U.S. interests were best served by promoting arms control measures which will alleviate potential causes of war. He suggested that there are three broad causes of war: the security dilemma in which acts by one party for the sake of increasing security are misinterpreted by another state as aggressive; hegemonic change which leads to instability; and irrational behavior which encompasses racial and ethnic animosities.

There were four ways in which a more elastic concept of arms control might help reduce the prospects of war: reducing capabilities through quantitative and qualitative measures;

reducing ambiguity through measures which go beyond confidence building; developing capabilities for conflict management through discussion, arbitration, mediation, and observers; and initiating steps to ensure cooperation enhancement. In the new era, it was argued, cooperative measures must be far broader and include things like economic aid for countries that cannot pass muster with the World Bank and the IMF. This would convey to these states that they still had a stake in the international system. The European Allies could play a key role in this, although the United States also had to be supportive.

The theme of the U.S. role in Europe was more fully developed by Lawrence Kaplan who directed his attention to two questions: Does the United States really want to stay in NATO?

Does Europe need or want the United States in or out of NATO? In essence his argument was that the United States could not easily depart from Europe, especially as the European allies did not want the United States to leave.

In Kaplan's view, a return to nonentanglement requires scenarios which are unlikely to become reality. One of these is a world similar to the nineteenth century in which America would be inviolate no matter what happened in Europe. In this period, the internecine quarrels of Europeans, and even the imperialist thrusts into other continents, had little relevance to American security. Autarchy seemed impossible even when the American economy was infused with British money and the outside world with American agricultural products. Such is not the situation in the late twentieth century. Technology may not have made a peaceful world, but it has made interdependence economically and militarily inescapable. Links to Europe forged over the last half century will be too strong to break no matter how distressed Americans may be with the way Europeans are organizing their policies and economies.

Although some claim that the United States is fed up with the Europeans, especially the lack of gratitude on their part, it is unlikely that there will be another great debate about NATO or that the far left and far right will come together to pull the United States out of Europe. The American public has accepted the normality of NATO and there is no unrest on American campuses over U.S. involvement in NATO. The predominant sentiment is a benign apathy about the issue which could serve to insulate the alliance against American isolationism.

For their part, Europeans are still anxious to retain a U.S. presence. While they welcomed the unification of Germany, NATO provides a place for the United States to live alongside Germany as a comforting balance to German power. Psychologically, to the Europeans, the United States still has a role to play in Europe. If a latent concern about Germany still animates Europeans, the specter of anarchy, civil war, and ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is more disturbing for the immediate future. Liberation may not bring democracy; it could bring nationalism, xenophobia, and fascism in its wake. In these circumstances, NATO, including the United States, could still have important military missions in Europe. The United States could also have a continuing role in contingencies outside the NATO area. With all of the talk of a rapid deployment corps composed primarily of European members of NATO, only the United States has the infrastructure to make it effective in the event of new out-of-area crises.

Since there is little likelihood that the functions which NATO assumes today will be taken over by other organizations, there is no substitute for the U.S. presence in NATO. This holds true even if the form of the organization is changed and American authority reduced. In spite of all the talk about the end of the Alliance, if not the end of history, not one member nation has taken

advantage of Article Thirteen of the North Atlantic Treaty and prepared for withdrawal. At least in the short-run, there is no alternative to NATO.

The third speaker in the session and the final conference speaker was Joseph Kruzel who provided a tour d'horizon of security issues. Acknowledging that a major reevaluation of the conceptual underpinnings of U.S. defense strategy was underway, Kruzel suggested that rethinking is required in three domains: strategic nuclear forces; conventional forces in Europe; and power projection forces. The assessment of each domain has three component parts: evaluating likely threats; identifying the appropriate U.S. response; and designing an appropriate force posture to meet threats and protect interests.

In terms of strategic nuclear forces, Kruzel argued that the Soviet Union will cease to exist. Most of its missiles will go to Russia, which will be likely to retain them and continue some force modernization. In addition, a few other successor republics will retain missiles. These "new" nuclear regimes will face command and control problems, as well as the risk of nuclear anarchy, with internal dissident groups vying for control of nuclear forces. The risk of unauthorized or accidental nuclear use will be much higher in the next decade than in the past. Even discounting this gloomy scenario, nuclear proliferation in other parts of the world is a high probability.

Even so, changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union mean that there will be considerable shrinkage in the target structure. Moreover, nuclear deterrence will be decoupled from conventional deterrence in a far more dramatic way than during the Cold War. The implications for the nuclear force posture of the United States are significant. The need for strategic weapons will plummet, and while the logic for a triad of strategic nuclear forces may endure, the modernization of each leg will be far less urgent. Strategic defense, on the other hand, will enjoy a renaissance as the threat of accidental, unauthorized, or third party attack accelerates in the coming decade.

As regards the second domain, European security, the most important question is the relevance of West European and U.S. military forces to the likely turmoil in Eastern Europe and the successor states of the Soviet Union. In response to this, Joseph Kruzel suggested that the threat of revanchist Russian imperialism and of fighting between the republics cannot be ruled out. In Eastern Europe, too, "hypernationalism" and the threat it poses to the integrity of the existing state system will be the central security problem over the next decade.

Whatever the security conflicts which beset the European continent in the future, Kruzel argued, there is a strong political rationale for NATO to continue in much its present form. It is important to keep Germany anchored in the Western Alliance and make it less likely to launch unilateral initiatives in security policy. At the same time the American presence in Europe is headed down to 150,000 and certain to go beyond that. It makes sense though to retain a force of

sufficient size to maintain a coherent military organization - something like a two-division corps (75,000 troops), associated air wings (perhaps three), and naval forces (a carrier battle group in the Mediterranean). Such a force would provide tangible evidence of a continued American commitment to European security and serve as a hedge against the unlikely possibility of a reconstituted Russian military threat.

Kruzel also looked briefly at the U.S. role beyond the North Atlantic, predicting in the Pacific and in the Middle East continued turmoil and violence. At the same time, the U.S. troop presence and base structure in the Pacific will decline significantly, something that will require the United States to pay more attention to mobility and sea power and to become accustomed to ad hoc negotiations for access to military bases.

Joseph Kruzel's conclusion was that the Cold War offered great clarity of threat and response, whereas, the post-Cold War era presents a far more complex environment in which security threats are more diffuse, and appropriate responses more difficult to determine. In these circumstances, a capable, mobile, smaller but still significant military force is essential to meet new challenges.

In the discussion which followed, it was suggested that the implication of all three papers was that there will be a period of unplanned decline in the U.S. military posture. No one will push the United States out, but the United States will leave and not get involved in messy situations. The question arose about the extent, though, to which the United States would be insulated from such conflicts and able to decouple its interests. Although there was no definitive answer to this--or to the future of U.S. linkage with Europe--there was agreement that there has to be an articulation of U.S. interests in Europe and that it will not suffice simply to use the argument that NATO anchors the United States to Europe. The interests of the United States in European security must be defined in terms the general public can understand. Appropriately, the final discussion centered around the issue of U.S. vital interests. Against the suggestion that in order to maximize U.S. room to manoeuvre, there might be some merit in keeping interests fuzzy vis-a-vis Europe and Japan, it was contended that U.S. vital interests include a flourishing European economy, maintenance of democracy, and growth of new democracies. There was agreement, however, that in the absence of a Soviet threat, the military balance has less and less to do with these vital interests. On this note, the conference came to an end.